Event Systems and Access Control by Méry, Dominique & Merz, Stephan
HAL Id: inria-00001262
https://hal.inria.fr/inria-00001262
Submitted on 21 Apr 2006
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Event Systems and Access Control
Dominique Méry, Stephan Merz
To cite this version:
Dominique Méry, Stephan Merz. Event Systems and Access Control. Sixth International IFIP WG 1.7
Workshop on Issues in the Theory of Security, Mar 2006, Vienna/Austria, pp.40-54. ￿inria-00001262￿
in
ria
-0
00
01
26
2,
 v
er
si
on
 1
 -
 2
1 
A
pr
 2
00
6
Event Systems and Access Control⋆
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Abstract. We consider the interpretations of notions of access control (permis-
sions, interdictions, obligations, and user rights) as run-time properties of infor-
mation systems specified as event systems with fairness. We give proof rules
for verifying that an access control policy is enforced in a system, and consider
preservation of access control by refinement of event systems. In particular, re-
finement of user rights is non-trivial; we propose to combinelow-level user rights
and system obligations to implement high-level user rights.
1 Introduction
The specification of access control policies for information systems is a fundamental
building block of a methodology for describing and assessing the security of informa-
tion infrastructure. Existing languages for describing access control such as RBAC [22]
and OrBAC [17] focus on the static structure of information systems. They identify
the actors (abstractly represented as roles), objects (abstracted as views), and activi-
ties that intervene in an information system, and then impose c nstraints on activities,
in the form of permissions and prohibitions. Certain formalisms also encompass more
advanced security properties such as rights or obligationsof actors to perform certain
activities. OrBAC makes a step toward specifying access control policies that may de-
pend on run-time information by associating rights with contexts. However, it is not
possible within OrBAC to verify that a system enforces a given access control policy,
because the dynamic behavior of the system is not modeled.
In this paper, we propose to relate the specification of access ontrol policies to
formal models of dynamic system behavior, and we give proof rules to demonstrate that
a system implements an access control policy. Changing somewhat the perspective, one
can also pose the problem of deriving a security monitor thatenforces a policy for a
fixed, underlying system.
We describe information systems within the well-known paradigm of event systems,
see e.g. [2,3,7]. Run-time properties of event systems can be specified as formulas of
temporal logic, and there are well-established verification rules to derive properties of
event systems. We are therefore led to interpret access control primitives as properties of
runs of event systems: permissions and prohibitions are easily expressed as constraints
on the enabling condition of events. Dually, the right of an actor to perform a certain
activity can be expressed as a lower bound on the enabling condition. The interpretation
⋆ This work was partly supported by the project Desirs of ACI S´ecurité Informatique.
of obligations is less obvious, and we propose to interpret th m as liveness properties,
expressible in temporal logic.
Event systems have traditionally been associated with a formal development method
based on stepwise refinement. We therefore consider how access ontrol annotations are
preserved under system refinement. Because permissions, prhibitions, and obligations
are interpreted as safety and liveness properties of runs, standard results about refine-
ment of event systems ensure that they are preserved by refinem nt. Preservation of
user rights requires extra conditions, and the precise formulation is non-trivial when the
“grain of atomicity” of a system description changes duringrefinement. We propose a
condition that relies on a combination of concrete-level usr rights and obligations. We
illustrate our proposals with a running example of a simple loan management system
on which different access control requirements can be imposed.
Related work.The existing literature on formalisms for the specificationof access con-
trol considers mainly static methods of analysis. For example, Bertino et al. [10] and
Cuppens et al. [11], among others, analyze security policies for inconsistencies, and
Benferhat et al. [9] consider techniques to resolve such inconsistencies based on strati-
fication of rules.
Closer to our concerns is work by Ryan et al. [13,23] on the useof model check-
ing for verifying access-control policies. However, we work in a deductive framework,
and we are mainly interested in verifying refinement relationships. Koch et al. [18] sug-
gest a UML notation for specifying access control, togetherwith a semantics based on
graph transformation and corresponding analysis techniques. More distantly related is
the work around UMLSec [16], which is mainly concerned with secrecy properties. In
particular, Jürjens [15] considers the preservation of secrecy properties by the refine-
ment concepts of the specification language Focus.
2 Fair Event Systems
We use the well-known paradigm of event systems [2,3,7], extended by weak fairness
conditions, to express system models.1 This section gives a brief overview over the
syntax we use to describe systems and their properties, and intro uces associated veri-
fication rules.
2.1 Event systems and their runs
A system specification lists the constant parameters, including any underlying sets,
functions, and relations that describe the data over which the system operates. Acon-
stant assumption Hypconstrains the values of these constants; it is syntactically ex-
pressed as a first-order logic formula over the constant parameters.
More importantly, a specification declares a tuplevar of state variables that repre-
sent the current state of the system. The runs of a system are ch acterized by ani itial
1 Adding strong fairness would not pose any conceptual problems, but it would complicate the
presentation because we would have to introduce more elaborate temporal logic operators.
condition, which is a state predicateInit over the variablesvar, and a list ofeventsthat
describe the possible system transitions. We write the definition of an evente, with list
of parametersx, as
evente(x) = BAe(x,var,var′)
fairnessfaire(x,var)
In such a definition,BAe is the before-after predicate for the event; this is a first-order
formula built from the constants declared for the system specification, the event’s pa-
rametersx, as well as primed and unprimed occurrences of the system variablesvar. As
is conventional, a primed occurrencev′ of a state variablev denotes the value ofv in the
state following the transition described byBAe, while an unprimed occurrence denotes
the value ofv in the state before the transition. Each event is associatedwi h a fairness
condition, expressed by a predicatefaire(x,var). Intuitively, the fairness condition rules
out traces where the predicatefaire(x,var) remains true but the evente(x) never occurs.
For an evente(x), we define its feasibility condition
fise(x) ∆= ∃var′ : BAe(x,var,var′) (1)
by existentially quantifying over the primed occurrences of the state variables; thus, the
state predicatefise(x) is true of those states that have a successor state related byan
occurrence of the evente(x).
Finally, a system specification should provide aninvariant that constrains the set of
reachable states, syntactically specified by a state predicateInvover the system variables
var.
A system specification is well-formed if all of the followingconditions hold:
– The initial condition implies the invariant:
Hyp |= Init(var) ⇒ Inv(var) (2)
– The invariant is preserved by any event, for any instantiation of the parameters:
Hyp |= Inv(var)∧BAe(x,var,var
′) ⇒ Inv(var′) (3)
– For any event, the fairness condition implies the feasibility of the event:
Hyp |= Inv(var)∧ faire(x,var) ⇒ fise(x) (4)
Observe that we allow the fairness condition to be strictly stronger than the feasi-
bility predicate. For example, an event without fairness assumption can be modeled
by declaring the fairness condition to befalse.
In the following, we simplify the notation by writingPandP′ for P(var) andP(var′)
whenP is a state predicate andA(x) for A(x,var,var′) whenA is a formula that con-
tains both primed and unprimed occurrences of state variables, such as a before-after
predicate.
systemBank
constantsClient, Loan, maxDebt
assumptionClient 6= /0∧Loan 6= /0∧maxDebt∈ Q
variables clt, loans,due, rate,maxExtra,extra
invariant ∧ loans⊆ Loan
∧ clt ∈ [loans→ Client]∧due∈ [loans→ Q]∧ rate∈ [loans→ Q]
∧ maxExtra∈ [loans→ Q]∧extra∈ [loans→ Q]
∧ ∀c∈ Client :
(
∑{due(ll) : ll ∈ loans∧clt(ll) = c}
)
≤ maxDebt
initial loans= /0∧clt = /0∧due= /0∧ rate= /0∧maxExtra= /0∧extra= /0
eventnewLoan(c, l,amt,dur,mx) =
∧ c∈ Client∧ l ∈ Loan\ loans∧amt∈ Q∧dur ∈ N
∧ amt+
(
∑{due(ll) : ll ∈ loans∧clt(ll) = c}
)
≤ maxDebt
∧ loans′ = loans∪{l}∧clt′ = clt∪{l 7→ c}
∧ due′ = due∪{l 7→ sum}∧ rate′ = rate∪{l 7→ sum/dur}
∧ maxExtra′ = maxExtra∪{l 7→ mx}∧extra′ = extra∪{l 7→ 0}
fairness false
eventpayRate(l) =
∧ l ∈ loans
∧ due′ = due⊕{l 7→ due(l)− rate(l)}
∧ loans′ = loans∧clt′ = clt∧ rate′ = rate∧maxExtra′ = maxExtra∧extra′ = extra
fairness l ∈ loans∧due(l) > 0
eventextraPayBack(l,amt) =
∧ l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q
∧ due′ = due⊕{l 7→ due(l)−amt}∧extra′ = extra⊕{l 7→ extra(l)+amt}
∧ loans′ = loans∧clt′ = clt∧ rate′ = rate∧maxExtra′ = maxExtra
fairness false
end system
Fig. 1.Sample system specification.
Figure 1 shows a specification of a simple event system that will serve as a running
example for this paper2. It models a simple management system for loans: clients can
take out loans provided they are not overly indebted, and they s ould pay them back,
either by paying the rates due or via extra payments. The specification is written in a
language of set theory where functions are sets of pairsx 7→ y and where⊕ denotes
function override. It is easy to verify that this specification is well-formed according to
the above criteria. At this point, we only give the model of the base information system,
it will later be extended with annotations corresponding toaccess control primitives.
Runs of a system specification areω-sequencesσ = s0s1 . . . of states (i.e., valuations
of variables) that satisfy the following conditions:
– the initial states0 satisfies the initial condition,
– any two successive states( i ,si+1) either satisfy the before-after predicateBAe(x)
for some evente and some parameter valuesx, or agree on the values of all system
variablesvar (so-called stuttering steps), and
2 We adopt the convention of writing long conjunctions and disjunctions as “lists” bulleted with
∧ and∨, relying on indentation to save parentheses.
P∧BAe(x) ⇒ P
′ for all eventse(x)
(stable)
stableP
Init ⇒ P stableP
(induct)
inv P
inv P P⇒ Q
(inv-weaken)
inv Q
P∧BAa(x)∧¬BAe(t) ⇒ P′∨Q′ for all eventsa(x)
P⇒ faire(t) (fair)
P Q∨ (P∧e(t))
∀x∈ S: F(x) G∨ (∃y∈ S: y≺ x∧F(y)) (S,≺) well-founded
(wfo)
(∃x∈ S: F(x)) G
P∧BAe(t) ⇒ Q
′
(effect)
P∧e(t) Q
F ⇒ G
(refl)
F G
inv I I ∧F G
(inv-leadsto)
F G∧ I
F G G H
(trans)
F H
F H G H
(disj)
F∨G H
F(x) G(x)
(exists)
(∃x : F(x)) (∃x : G(x))
Fig. 2.Verification rules for fair event systems.
– σ satisfies all fairness conditions: for each eventand all parameter valuesx there
are infinitely many positionsi ∈ N such that either the fairness conditionfaire(x) is
false atsi or (si ,si+1) satisfyBAe(x).
The well-formedness conditions (2) and (3) above ensure that each statesi of a
system run satisfies the system invariant. If only countablymany event instances are
feasible at each state of a system run, the condition (4) implies that the specification
is machine-closed [1], but this observation will not play a role in the remainder of this
paper.
2.2 Properties of runs
We can reason about the runs of fair event systems using elementary temporal logic.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider safety properties stableP and inv P where
P is a state predicate, and liveness propertiesF G (“F leads toG”) whereF andG
are Boolean combinations of state predicates and event formulase(x) for eventse of
the underlying event system. These formulas are interpreted ov r a runσ = s0s1 . . . as
follows:
σ |= stableP iff for all n∈ N, if σ|n |= P thenσ|m |= P for all m≥ n
σ |= inv P iff σ|n |= P for all n∈ N
σ |= F G iff for all n∈ N, if σ|n |= F thenσ|m |= G for somem≥ n
In these definitions,σ|n |= F means that formulaF holds of the suffix ofσ from point
n onwards: ifF is a state predicate then it should be satisfied at staten, if F is an event
formulae(x) then the defining action formulaBAe(x) should hold of the pair of states
(sn,sn+1).
Figure 2 contains proof rules for deriving properties of fair event systems; simi-
lar proof rules can be found, for example, in papers on the Unity [21] or TLA [19]
formalisms. As before,Init denotes the initial condition of the system specification,
BAe(t) denotes the before-after predicate defining the event instancee(t), andfaire(t)
represents the fairness condition associated with that event instance. The variablex in
rules (stable) and (fair) is assumed to be different from thefre variables ofP, Q or
BAe(t).
The rule (fair) is the basic proof rule for establishing leadsto properties; its sound-
ness relies on the underlying assumption of weak fairness. Rule (wfo) allows us to de-
rive liveness properties by induction over some well-founded ordering. The remaining
rules can be used to combine elementary leadsto formulas. Inproving the non-temporal
hypotheses of these rules, we may of course use any assumptions on the constants ap-
pearing in a system specification.
3 Specifying Access Control
Access control policies describe the conditions under which events may occur. Typi-
cally, one first specifies the actors (roles), objects (views), and activities of an informa-
tion system, and then describes which actors are allowed to (or not allowed to) perform
which activities on which objects. The OrBAC formalism [17]refines this general idea:
first, access control policies are described within organisations (e.g., a hospital or a
bank). Second, and more significantly, one can specify conditi s under which an ac-
cess is allowed by defining a “context” of access. Moreover, roles, views, and activities
are arranged in hierarchies, with access rules for instances systematically derived with
the help of inheritance rules [12].
OrBAC thus provides a declarative, PROLOG-like language todefine access control
policies. The dynamic aspect of a system is captured by the notion f context, which
can be defined in terms of the system state. It is straightforward to translate an OrBAC
model into an event system: the static structure of roles andviews is represented by the
constant parameters of a system, activities correspond to the system’s events, and con-
texts are defined as state predicates. Without completely formalizing this translation, we
now consider how event systems can be extended to describe access ontrol policies.3
The interest in doing so can be twofold: first, an event systemcan be developed in order
to verify that it satisfies a given policy. Second, one may be int rested in enforcing an
access control policy over a fixed underlying system by imposing a security monitor.
We will consider both of these views for different access control primitives: permissions
and prohibitions, user rights, and obligations.
3.1 Permissions and prohibitions
At its base, an access control policy describes when an activity is permitted, and when
it is forbidden. Whereas permissions and prohibitions should be mutually exclusive,
3 The running example of Fig. 1 does not mention roles (actors), but it should be obvious how
to include them in the static model.
they need not cover all possible situations in cases where thpolicy is not completely
specified.
We represent permissions and prohibitions by associating two more predicates (be-
sides the fairness predicate already introduced in Sect. 2.1) with event definitions. For
example, a security policy might specify
eventnewLoan(c, l,amt,dur,mx)
permission l /∈ loans∧ risk(c,amt) ∈ {low,medium}∧mx≤ maxPayback(amt,dur)
prohibition risk(c,amt) = high
to indicate that a new loan for a client may be approved if the associated risk (evaluated
according to some unspecified risk function) is below a certain threshold value and if
the maximum amount permitted for extra payback is within certain bounds, and that a
new loan must not be approved if the risk is too high.
An event system implements the permissions and prohibitions declared in a security
policy if the event is feasible only if it is permitted and infeasible when it is forbidden.
Formally, we obtain the proof obligations
Hyp |= Inv∧fise(x) ⇒ perme(x) (5)
Hyp |= Inv∧prohe(x) ⇒¬fise(x) (6)
whereperme(x) andprohe(x) are the permission and prohibition predicates associated
with evente, andInv andHypare the system invariant and the constant assumptions, as
before.
The event system of Fig. 1 does not implement the above permissions and prohibi-
tions, as it does not evaluate the risk associated with a loan. A simple way of ensuring
that a system implements the permission and prohibition clauses of a security policy
is to conjoinperme(x)∧¬prohe(x) to the before-after predicate of the event definition.
Alternatively, the access control policy can be ensured at run ime by a separate monitor
that allows events to be activated only if the permissions and prohibitions are respected.
Observe, however, that strengthening the guard of an event may invalidate the well-
formedness condition (4) that states that the fairness predicate of an event should imply
its feasibility. We therefore add the following proof obligation to the well-formedness
conditions of an event system with permissions and prohibitions:
Hyp |= Inv∧ faire(x) ⇒ perme(x)∧¬prohe(x). (7)
This condition is trivially satisfied for the eventewLoanof our running example, be-
cause no fairness is required of that event.
3.2 User rights
Permissions and prohibitions restrict the feasibility of events. Dually, it may be interest-
ing to specifyuser rights: conditions that spell out when an activity should be permitted
in a system. User rights can again be represented in event systems by associating a cor-
responding predicate with an event. For example, we may wishto tate explicitly that a
client has the right to make extra payments within the agreed-upon limits:
eventextraPayBack(l,amt)
right l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q∧amt+extra(l)≤ maxExtra(l).
An event system implements a user right if the event is feasible whenever the pred-
icate specifying the right holds:
Hyp |= Inv∧ righte(x) ⇒ fise(x) (8)
Because a security monitor can only schedule existing events of the underlying system,
user rights will have to be verified over the event system itself rather than enforced by
a monitor. However, the monitor will have to observe a similar condition to make sure
that an event permitted by a right is never disabled by the monitor.
The conditions (5), (6), and (8) show that the right to perform an activity should
imply (assuming the system invariant) that the activity is allowed, and that it is not
forbidden. It is not unreasonable for a user right to be strictly stronger than the cor-
responding permission, or than the feasibility of the event. For example, a bank may
accept extra payments beyond the pre-determined bound at its discretion.
User rights can be understood as branching-time properties: whenever the predi-
caterighte(t) is true, the system has a possible continuation that begins with the event
(instance)e(t), and we will take up this discussion in Sect. 4.2.
3.3 Obligations
Languages for access control policies such as OrBAC also include primitives for spec-
ifying obligations. Intuitively, whereas a user right states when a certain activity may
occur, an obligation asserts that the activityshouldoccur. The article [17] introducing
the OrBAC notation does not define a formal semantics for obligations, but concepts
of permission, rights, and obligations have traditionallybeen the domain of deontic
logic [14,20]. To our knowledge, the interpretation of formulas of deontic logic over
models of information systems such as event systems has not been studied, and we do
not wish to introduce this extra complication.
As before, we associate obligations with events by defining suitable predicates. In
our running example, we might want to assert that a user has anobligation to pay the
rates as long as they are due by writing
eventpayRate(l)
obligation l ∈ loans∧due(l) > 0.
What does it formally mean for an event system to implement anobligation? A first
idea would be to interpret an obligation to perform a certainactivity as prohibiting the
system from performing any other activity. However, this interpretation appears to be
unreasonably stringent and prone to contradictions. For example, a user of a computer
system may have an obligation to regularly change his password, but he can do so only
when logged in. Clearly, the obligation to change the password should not preclude the
user from logging in, although it is conceivable that one could then prevent the user
from doing anything but changing his password.
We believe instead that obligations can, in a first approximation, be interpreted as
liveness properties, and can be formalized in temporal logic. The two following inter-
pretations appear particularly plausible.
strict obligation: oble(x)  e(x) (9)
weak obligation:oble(x)  ¬oble(x)∨e(x) (10)
The strict interpretation of obligations requires that theevent occurs eventually
whenever the obligation arises. Under the weak interpretation, he obligation ceases
as soon as the predicateoble becomes false, which need not be due to an occurrence of
e. In our example, the weak interpretation appears more reasonable: it is satisfied when
a client pays back the loan via an extra payment. Observe thatthe weak interpretation
of an obligation coincides with the interpretation of a weakf irness requirement, with
oble(x) as the fairness condition.
Whatever interpretation is chosen, the proof rules of Fig. 2can be used to verify
that a fair event system implements its obligations. The temporal interpretation of obli-
gations may also be of interest when one is interested in deriving a security monitor
that enforces obligations for a given system, at least for controllable events. To do so,
one could apply recent work on controller synthesis based ongame-theoretic interpre-
tations [6], but we do not pursue this idea any further here.
In some applications, the interpretation of obligations asliveness properties may be
too abstract, and it would be more natural to indicate real-time deadlines for obligations
(“the payment should be received before the end of the current mo th”). We do not
consider real-time specifications in this paper.
4 Refinement of System Specifications
Stepwise methods of system development insist that systemsshould be developed in
a succession of models that gradually add representation detail and that introduce new
correctness properties. The key requirement for a sensiblenotion of refinement is that
system properties that have been established at higher levels of abstraction are preserved
by construction so that they do not have to be reproven. Refineme t-based approaches
help to discover potential problems early on. They also distribute the overhead of for-
mal verification over the entire development process. We will first consider verification
conditions for proving refinement of fair event systems thatpreserve temporal logic
properties. In a second step, we will study how refinement interacts with the access
control primitives considered in Sect. 3.
4.1 Refinement of fair event systems
Standard refinement notions for event systems are known to preserve safety proper-
ties, and extensions for liveness and fairness properties have also been considered, for
example in [5,8]. In the following, we make use of the language of temporal logic of
Sect. 2.2 to state verification conditions for preserving liveness properties at a higher
level of abstraction than in traditional formulations.
Refined models describe the system at a finer level of granularity and typically in-
troduce new events that have no observable effect at the previous levels of abstraction.
Formally, we assume (without loss of generality) that the refinement is described with
the help of a tuplevarref of variables disjoint from the variablesvarabsused in the orig-
inal model. The two state spaces are related by agluing invariant J, a state predicate
built from the variablesvarabs andvarref , and the constant parameters of both models.
We may assume thatJ implies both the abstract-level and the concrete-level invariants
Invabs andInvref . An eventea(x) of the abstract model may be refined by a number of
low-level eventser1(x,y1), . . . , ern(x,yn); for technical simplicity, we assume that all
parameters ofeaare also parameters oferi , although this assumption could easily be
removed. Also, new eventsen(z) may be introduced in the refined model.
An event systemRef is a refinement of an event systemAbswith respect to the
gluing invariantJ if Ref is itself well-formed according to the conditions (2), (3),and
(4), and if moreover all the following conditions hold (again, we drop the variables that
occur in the respective predicates; besides,Hypdenotes the conjunction of the abstract-
and concrete-level constant assumptions).
– Every initial state of the refinement can be mapped to a corresponding initial state
of the abstract specification:
Hyp |= Initref ⇒∃varabs : Initabs∧J (11)
– Events of the refinement can be mapped to events or to stuttering transitions of the
abstract specification. There are two cases:
• If eventer(x,y) refines an abstract eventea(x) then its effect can be mapped to
an occurrence ofea:
Hyp |= J∧BAer(x,y) ⇒∃var
′
abs : BAea(x)∧J
′ (12)
• If eventen(z) is a new event then its effect is invisible at the abstract level4:
Hyp |= J∧BAen(z) ⇒∃var
′
abs : var
′
abs= varabs∧J
′ (13)
– The refinement preserves the fairness constraints of the abstract level. Formally,
assume that the abstract eventa(x) is refined by low-level eventser1(x,y1), . . . ,
ern(x,yn):
Ref |= J∧ fairea(x)
 ea1(x)∨ . . .∨ean(x)∨¬∃varabs : J∧ fairea(x)
(14)
where the “abstract trace”ai(x) of eri(x,yi) is defined as
eai(x)
∆
= ∃yi : ∧ eri(x,yi)
∧ ∀varabs,var′abs : J∧J
′ ⇒ ea(x)
Intuitively, condition (14) requires to prove that any state in a run of the refinement
that corresponds to a state satisfying the abstract fairness condition of eventea(x)
is followed either by the occurrence of one of the refining actions or by a state that
no longer satisfies the fairness condition. Although the formal statement is some-
what technical, the abstract-level fairness condition is conveniently represented as
a concrete-level “leads to” formula that can be establishedusing the proof system
4 As suggested in [4], this requirement could be weakened by requiring that eventen(z) merely
preserves the high-level invariant.
of Fig. 2. In particular, any fairness conditions of the implementation may be used,
as well as induction over well-founded orderings. In this way, a specifier has much
more freedom in justifying a refinement than with the more tradi ional verification
conditions of [5,8].
Using a standard simulation argument that critically relies on the possibility of stut-
tering in the definition of runs of event systems, one obtainsthe following correctness
theorem: every run of the refined event systemRef corresponds to a run of the abstract
event systemAbs, modulo the gluing invariant.
Theorem 1. Assume that Ref is a refinement of Abs with respect to the gluing invariant
J and thatσ = s0s1 . . . is a run of Ref . Then there is a runτ = t0t1 . . . of Abs such that J
holds at the joint valuations obtained from si and ti , for all i ∈ N.
As a consequence, temporal logic properties can be transferred from an abstract
event systemAbsto its refinementRef modulo the gluing invariantJ. Formally, this is
asserted by the following corollary.
Corollary 2. Assume that Ref is a refinement of Abs with respect to the gluing invariant
J and thatσ = s0s1 . . . is a run of Ref . If Abs|= ϕ then Ref|= ϕ whereϕ is obtained from
ϕ by replacing every positive occurrence of a non-temporal formula A by∃varabs: J∧A
and every negative occurrence by∀varabs : J ⇒ A.
4.2 Refinement preserving access control
Let us now consider how refinement interacts with access control policies. Assume
that event systemRef is a refinement ofAbswith respect to the gluing invariantJ. Also,
assume thatAbswas known to implement certain permissions, prohibitions,bligations
or user rights concerning an abstract eventea(x).
For permissionspermea(x) and prohibitionsprohea(x), the conditions (5) and (6)
ensure thatpermea(x) and¬prohea(x) hold whenever eventea(x) occurs in a run of
Abs. Any concrete-level eventer(x,y) refiningea(x) has to satisfy condition (12). Us-
ing the definition of feasibility (1) and first-order logic, it follows thatpermea(x) and
¬prohea(x) hold whenever eventer(x) occurs in a run ofRef. This is the best preserva-
tion result we can hope for in such a general discussion of refinement modulo a gluing
invariant; for most practical choices ofJ these formulas will imply that the abstract-
level permissions and prohibitions are preserved in the refined system.
Similarly, obligations have been interpreted as liveness properties, represented by
the temporal logic formulas (9) or (10). Corollary 2 impliesthat a similar “leads to”
formula is true of the refined model, again modulo translation al ng the gluing invariant.
Therefore, obligations are preserved in the same sense as permissions and prohibitions.
These preservation results are not really surprising: we hav interpreted permis-
sions, prohibitions, and obligations as (safety or liveness) properties of runs, and the
refinement notion of event systems are defined in such a way that properties of runs
are preserved. However, we have also considered user rights, w ich were interpreted as
branching properties in Sect. 3.2, and refinement of event systems does not necessarily
preserve branching behavior.
eventaskPayback(l,amt) =
∧ l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q
∧ askExtra′ = askExtra∪{l 7→ amt}
∧ loans′ = loans∧clt′ = clt∧due′ = due∧ rate′ = rate
∧ maxExtra′ = maxExtra∧extra′ = extra
right l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q
eventapprovePayback(l,amt) =
∧ (l 7→ amt) ∈ askExtra∧amt+extra(l) ≤ maxExtra(l)
∧ due′ = due⊕{l 7→ due(l)−amt}∧extra′ = extra⊕{l 7→ extra(l)+amt}
∧ askExtra′ = askExtra\{l 7→ amt}
∧ loans′ = loans∧clt′ = clt∧ rate′ = rate∧maxExtra′ = maxExtra
fairness(l 7→ amt) ∈ askExtra∧amt+extra(l) ≤ maxExtra(l)
eventrejectPayback(l,amt) =
∧ (l 7→ amt) ∈ askExtra∧amt+extra(l) > maxExtra(l)
∧ askExtra′ = askExtra\{l 7→ amt}
∧ due′ = due∧extra′ = extra
∧ loans′ = loans∧clt′ = clt∧ rate′ = rate∧maxExtra′ = maxExtra
Fig. 3.Refining eventextraPayback.
For a concrete example, consider a proposed refinement of theeventextraPayback
shown in Fig. 3. Instead of an atomic event modeling an extra payment, the refine-
ment introduces a protocol: the client has to apply for making a extra payment (event
askPayback), and this application can be approved or rejected by the bank, depending
on the situation of the loan. The refinement is acceptable according to the conditions
(12) and (13) becauseapprovePaybackrefines the abstract eventextraPaybackwhereas
the eventsaskPaybackandrejectPaybackare unobservable at the abstract level. How-
ever, the refinement does not literally preserve the user right
eventextraPayBack(l,amt)
right l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q∧amt+extra(l)≤ maxExtra(l).
considered in Sect. 3.2: the concrete-level eventapprovePaybackrequires the precon-
dition (l 7→ amt) ∈ askExtra, which is not implied by the predicate specifying the user
right. Preservation of user rights thus requires extra consideration.
A first idea would be to impose the condition
Hyp |= Invref ∧ rightea(x) ⇒ (∃y1 : fiser1(x,y1))∨ . . .∨ (∃yn : fisern(x,yn)) (15)
where againer1(x,y1), . . . ,ern(x,yn) are the concrete-level events corresponding to the
abstract eventea. Although condition (15) obviously preserves user rights,it would
rule out the refinement of Fig. 3. More generally, this condition appears too strong to
us, when the concrete model refines the grain of atomicity. Recall that a single abstract-
level eventea can be implemented in the refinement by a sequence of concrete-lev l
events all but the last of which are invisible at the abstractlevel. The final eventer
refining the abstract eventea need not be immediately feasible in the concrete model
whenevereais, but it requires preparation by the auxiliary events thatare unobservable
at the abstract level. We therefore believe that a more useful condition for refining user
rights is to require a combination of concrete-level user rights that ensure that the branch
leading toer can be started and concrete-level obligations that ensure that r will then
occur eventually.
Formally, assume that the abstract system specification contains an eventea(x) for
which we wish to ensure a user right via predicaterightea(x). Also assume thatea(x)
is refined by the concrete-level eventser1(x,y1), . . . , ern(x,yn). We then require the
event systemRef to contain eventsei1(x,z1), . . . , eim(x,zm) with user rights specified
by righteij (x,zj) such that
rightea(x) ⇒ (∃z1 : rightei1(x,z1))∨ . . .∨ (∃zm : righteim(x,zm)) and (16)
eij(x,zj) ¬rightea(x)∨ (∃y1 : er1(x,y1))∨ . . .∨ (∃yn : ern(x,yn)) (17)
Condition (17) applies for allj = 1, . . . ,m; the disjunct¬rightea(x) on the right-hand
side of (17) corresponds to a weak interpretation of obligations.
The above conditions, together with the interpretations ofthe user rights for the
refined specification, imply that whenever the translated abstr ct user right holds at
some point during a concrete-level run, the user has a concrete-level right to start a
branch which will eventually lead to the occurrence of an event r fining the original
eventea(x) provided the abstract-level right persists. For example, th abstract-level
right may cease due to the concurrent exercise of another right.
Back to the example of Fig. 3, we claim that this refinement respects the abstract-
level user right because it satisfies the conditions (16) and(17). We assume that the
gluing invariant contains the conjunct
askExtra⊆ loans×Q
that asserts the “type correctness” of the new variableskExtra. We chooseaskPayback
for the auxiliary eventei, and condition (16) boils down to proving
l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q∧amt+extra(l)≤ maxExtra(l) ⇒ l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q
which is trivial. On the other hand, condition (17) requiresus to show
askPayback(l,amt) ∨ ¬(l ∈ loans∧amt∈ Q∧amt+extra(l)≤ maxExtra(l))
∨ grantPayback(l,amt)
and this condition is ensured by the fairness condition for eventapprovePayback. Note
that although the abstract user right is preserved, the client cannot cheat on the bank by
demanding two extra payments that together would exceed theallowed limit: although a
client may always ask for an extra payment (including in the time between applying for
a payment and the approval or rejection by the bank), the bank’s obligation to approve
extra payments ceases when the limit has been reached, so it is free to reject a second
application for extra payments. This is just what the abstract user right of Sect. 3.2
required.
5 Conclusion
Event systems are a convenient and widely accepted framework for modeling informa-
tion systems. In particular, properties of their runs can bederived using well-known
rules, and refinement concepts for event systems are well established. In this paper, we
have considered annotating event systems with clauses to specify access control prop-
erties, thereby implementing a given security policy. Existing, declarative languages for
describing access control such as OrBAC identify the staticstructure of an information
system, including the subjects, the objects, and the activities, and then spell out the con-
ditions under which activities may, must, or must not be performed. In this paper, we
have interpreted such policies within a formal system modelbased on event systems,
and have proposed proof rules for verifying that a system imple ents a security policy.
We have considered permissions and prohibitions, which arethe most frequent anno-
tations in practice, and which can be interpreted as safety properties of system runs.
We have proposed to interpret obligations as liveness properties, and have therefore
used a simple temporal logic to formulate these as properties of event systems. As a
fourth category of primitives, we have considered user rights, which can be interpreted
as elementary branching properties of systems.
Development methods based on stepwise refinement have traditionnally been asso-
ciated with event systems. They allow a developer to justifya s stem as a result of a se-
quence of models that introduce more and more details in the repr sentation of systems,
as well as their correctness properties. The cornerstone ofr finement is the preserva-
tion of properties that have been established for abstract models. Standard refinement
concepts preserve traces of models, and this ensures preservation of permissions, prohi-
bitions, and obligations across refinements. Branching properties, including user rights,
are not automatically preserved, and we have proposed additional conditions that rely
on a combination of concrete-level rights and obligations.
More experience will be necessary to evaluate whether our notions are useful and
feasibility in practice. It would also be helpful to have an integrated tool environment
for combining event system descriptions and access controlspecifications. On a more
conceptual level, it will be interesting to study the possibility of synthesizing security
monitors that enforce a security policy (that could possibly even vary during runtime)
over a fixed underlying information system.
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12. F. Cuppens, N. Cuppens-Boulahia, and A. Miège. Inheritance hierarchies in the or-bac model
and application in a network environment. In A. Sabelfeld, eitor, Proc. Foundations of
Computer Security (FCS04), pages 41–60, Turku,Finland, 2004. Turku Center for Computer
Science, Report G-31.
13. Dimitar P. Guelev, Mark Ryan, and Pierre-Yves Schobbens. Model-checking access control
policies. InProc. 7th Intl. Conf. Information Security (ISC 2004), volume 3225 ofLecture
Notes in Computer Science, pages 219–230, Palo Alto, CA, 2004. Springer.
14. Risto Hilpinen, editor.New Studies in Deontic Logic: Norms, Actions, and the Foundations
of Ethics, volume 152 ofSynthese Library. D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Holland, 1981.
15. J. Jürjens. Secrecy-preserving refinement. In J. Fiadeiro and P. Zave, editors,Intl. Symp.
Formal Methods Europe (FME 2001), volume 2021 ofLecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 135–152. Springer, 2001.
16. Jan Jürjens.Secure Systems Development with UML. Springer, 2004.
17. A. Abou El Kalam, R. El Baida, P. Balbiani, S. Benferhat, F. Cuppens, Y. Deswarte,
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